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THE PRICE OF MISDEMEANOR REPRESENTATION
ERICA J. HASHIMOTO*
ABSTRACT
Nobody disputes either the reality of excessive caseloads in
indigent defense systems or their negative effects. More than forty
years after Gideon v. Wainwright, however, few seem willing to
accept that additional resources will not magically appear to solve
the problem. Rather, concerned observers demand more funds while
state and local legislators resist those entreaties in the face of
political resistance and pressures to balance government budgets.
Recognizing that indigent defense systems must operate in a world
of limited resources, states should reduce the number of cases
streaming into those systems by significantly curtailing the appoint-
ment of counsel in low-level misdemeanor cases, thereby freeing up
resources for more effective representation of those charged with more
serious crimes. States can achieve this result without violating
constitutional requirements by: (1) amending overbroad appoint-
ment statutes, (2) reducing penalties for certain minor offenses, (3)
amending probation statutes, and (4) requiring judges and prosecu-
tors to identify at the beginning of the proceedings those misde-
meanor cases that are the most serious.
Although it may appear that denying counsel to some misde-
meanor defendants will prejudice their interests, empirical evidence
suggests that counsel in misdemeanor cases do not typically provide
significant benefits to many of their clients. Rather than spending
resources on low-value representation, states should use those
resources to reduce the caseloads of indigent defenders, thereby
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increasing the quality of representation in felony and serious
misdemeanor cases. To ensure that result, states should, and indeed
must, couple reforms designed to reduce counsel appointment in
misdemeanor cases with enforceable, numerical limits on per-
attorney caseloads.
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INTRODUCTION
Outrageously excessive caseloads have compromised the quality
of indigent defense representation.1 Nationwide, even public de-
fenders representing defendants charged with serious felonies
sometimes represent as many as 500 clients per year.2 As one
public defender put it: 'When caseloads are so high that a public
defender can only spend 3.8 hours per case, including serious
felony cases, [our] public defenders cannot ensure reliability."3
Despite the scarcity of attorney resources, indigent defense
systems force counsel to direct significant attention to low-level
misdemeanor cases. In North Carolina, for instance, an indigent
criminal defendant charged with a second littering offense has a
right to court-appointed counsel.4 In order to help solve the indigent
defense crisis, states should redirect resources now spent on such
matters to reduce indigent defender caseloads so that those who
represent defendants charged with more serious crimes will have
more time to spend on those cases.
The two major sources of the caseload problem are easy to
identify. First, the number of court-appointed criminal cases in
1. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled
to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 391-92 (1993) (identifying
problems caused by excessive caseloads); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's
Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1509 (2003) (recognizing that caseload caps are critical
to quality representation); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the
Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IowA L. REV. 219, 236-37 (2004) (advocating for parity of
resources between prosecutors and defense attorneys and for caseload parity); see also Mary
Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1054-57 (2006) (detailing the problem of crushing caseloads for indigent
defense counsel); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and
the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 908 (2004) (identifying excessive caseloads
as one of the problems confronting indigent defense systems in this country); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations To Sustain Public Defenders, 106
HARv. L. REV. 1239, 1240-41 (1993) (noting that "staggering caseloads" lead to "burnout"
among public defenders).
2. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
3. Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1058.
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-399 (2005) (making it a Class 3 misdemeanor punishable by
a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $2000 for a second littering violation); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1) (2005) (providing a right to counsel in any case in which a fine of $500
or more is likely).
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state and local courts has increased sharply, more than doubling
and perhaps even tripling during the past twenty years.5 Those
increases are traceable to: (1) the Supreme Court's decision to
expand the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases;' (2) steady
increases in the number of cases prosecuted;7 and (3) rising levels of
indigence among criminal defendants.' Second, indigent defense
budgets have not kept pace with the increased number of cases
pouring into the indigent defense system.9 Lacking sufficient funds
to hire additional attorneys to handle the influx of new cases,
decision makers at every level of government have simply piled
additional cases on top of the existing caseloads of indigent defense
attorneys.
For years, indigent defense advocates have clamored for more
funding to address this crisis. Not only have those pleas fallen on
deaf ears, 10 but the continued focus on additional resources has also
obscured discussion of the other-and no less pressing--cause of
excessive caseloads: the increase in the number of cases in which
counsel are appointed. After all, if the total number of cases were to
drop rather than to rise, caseloads would decrease even if budgets
did not increase except for inflation adjustments. Although one
might examine a number of factors contributing to increased
caseloads, this Article focuses on low-level misdemeanor cases
-cases in which states currently appoint counsel but in which those
counsel do not appear to provide significant benefit to the defen-
dants-and the ways in which a state could limit appointment in
those cases.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
7. See infra Part II.A.2.
8. See infra Part II.A.3.
9. Although the total number of cases has more than doubled and probably close to
tripled, budgets for indigent defense at most have increased 75 percent. See infra Part II.B.
10. Some argue that the failure to fund indigent defense adequately results from a
conscious decision on the part of legislators to shortchange criminal defendants because
defendants are politically unpopular. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 148-70 (1980). Although that may be part of the explanation for budget shortfalls,
another part is that many worthy and important programs do not receive sufficient funding
in a world of limited resources. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense
Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004)
(noting that in a world of limited resources, "some funding scarcity for worthy programs will
exist").
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A focus on reducing the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor
cases is appropriate because new data suggest that the value added
by defense counsel in misdemeanor cases is lower than the value
added in more serious cases.1 In terms of both overall outcome
(conviction or no conviction) and sentencing outcomes (the severity
of the penalty imposed in the event of conviction), pro se misde-
meanor defendants in federal court have significantly better
results than do represented misdemeanor defendants. 2 Indeed, in
the federal system, pro se misdemeanor defendants have better
outcomes than every category of represented misdemeanor defen-
dants, including those who retain attorneys and those represented
by appointed counsel.' The data do not definitively establish that
appointment of counsel for misdemeanor defendants is not neces-
sary, especially because data exist only for misdemeanor defendants
in federal court and not state court. At the very least, however, the
empirical evidence suggests that the value added by counsel in less
serious misdemeanor cases is far lower than the value added in
more serious cases.
In light of this data, it appears that states could reduce the
number of cases in which counsel is appointed without significantly
undermining the accuracy of results in those proceedings. There is,
however, a significant obstacle to simply discontinuing the appoint-
ment of counsel in low-level misdemeanor cases. The difficulty is
that the Constitution requires appointment of counsel for many,
though not all, misdemeanor defendants, and the Supreme Court
has not made it easy to ascertain, at the time the decision regarding
appointment of counsel is made, whether a misdemeanor defendant
has the right to counsel. Essentially, a misdemeanor defendant's
right to counsel depends on the sentence he receives at the conclu-
sion of the proceeding. Because it is so difficult to determine the
sentence at the beginning of the case, states appoint counsel in
many cases in which it later turns out no right to counsel existed.
Indeed, many states have adopted statutes explicitly providing a
11. As discussed in Part III.A, infra, there are no data on state court misdemeanants that
would permit this sort of analysis, so the data are limited to federal court misdemeanants.
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra text accompanying note 132, Table 3.
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right to counsel for misdemeanor defendants even in the absence of
a federal constitutional right.14
Despite the confusion created by the Supreme Court in this area,
there are four steps that states can take to limit appointment of
counsel to those cases in which the need for appointment is most
justified. First, states that currently provide a statutory right to
counsel in all misdemeanor cases-regardless of penalty-should
amend their statutes so that the defendant's statutory right to
counsel mirrors the federal constitutional right to counsel. Second,
states should modify penalties for some minor offenses so that those
offenses do not give rise to a right to counsel. Third, states should
alter the structure of probation so that the imposition of a proba-
tionary sentence does not give rise to a right to counsel. Finally,
states should establish procedures so that determinations regarding
potential sentences in misdemeanor cases are made at the outset of
the case.
If implemented, these reforms should produce a decrease in the
number of cases entering the indigent defense system, thereby
leading to a reduction in the caseloads of indigent defenders. In
order to ensure that the reduction in the total number of cases
actually leads to a caseload reduction, rather than a reduction in the
budgets for indigent defense systems, jurisdictions should couple
these reforms with the adoption of enforceable, numerical caseload
limitations. Because the Supreme Court has failed to recognize
caseload limitations as a constitutional requirement, states must
take the initiative in adopting them. These limits can take many
forms and can be enforced through a variety of mechanisms. To be
successful, however, these initiatives must include specific numeri-
cal limitations and those limitations must be enforceable. Adoption
of such measures will ensure that decreases in the number of cases
requiring appointment of counsel will in fact lower the caseloads of
indigent defense providers.
14. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4602 (2003) (providing a right to counsel to any
"indigent person who is under arrest or charged with a crime"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1)
(2005) (providing a right to counsel in any case in which a fine of $500 or more is "likely to be
adjudged"); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321 (Vt. 1991) (interpreting title 13, section 5231 of the
Vermont Code to provide a right to counsel in all cases in which either imprisonment or a fine
in excess of $1000 is imposed).
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This Article contains four parts. Part I describes the excessive
caseloads in indigent defense systems and the problems associated
with excessive caseloads. Part II examines the causes of those
excessive caseloads, including the fact that the total number of cases
has risen between 100 percent and 200 percent over the past twenty
years, whereas indigent defense funding has increased, at most, 75
percent. Part III proposes reforms designed to eliminate the
appointment of counsel in low-level misdemeanor cases that trigger
no Sixth Amendment right, and highlights data suggesting that any
benefit conferred by counsel in such cases is at best minimal.
Finally, Part IV sets forth a recommendation that states adopt
enforceable, numerical caseload limits so that resources conserved
through the elimination of appointments in misdemeanor cases will
be used to reduce the caseloads of indigent defenders representing
defendants charged with more serious offenses.
I. THE CASELOAD CRISIS
More than four decades ago, in Gideon v. Wainwright," the
Supreme Court held that defendants who cannot afford to hire
counsel have a Sixth Amendment right to state-appointed represen-
tation."6 As a result, the state must provide counsel for indigent
defendants before prosecuting them. Although some commentators
have referred to Gideon and its progeny as an "enormous unfunded
mandate,"17 the budget consequences of Gideon on states and
counties were not immediately apparent because most jurisdictions
were already providing some sort of counsel to defendants charged
with felonies. 8
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. Id. at 344. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel, and
that this requirement of the Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)). The Court previously had
held that defendants charged with felonies in federal court had a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
17. Lefstein, supra note 1, at 843.
18. See Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 104-05 (1970). At the time the Court decided Gideon, forty
states required the appointment of counsel in all felony cases, and four additional states in
practice appointed counsel in all felony cases. Id. at 104 & n.13. Only five states-Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina-limited appointment of counsel to
468 [Vol. 49:461
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The fiscal impact of the Court's decision stemmed primarily from
the fact that most jurisdictions had been appointing counsel on an
ad hoc basis and lacked comprehensive systems to provide counsel
to indigent defendants. 9 In order to comply with Gideon's mandate,
states scrambled to create indigent defense systems. In the pre-
Gideon period, only 3 percent of the counties in the country had
indigent defender systems, ° and only five states had statewide
public defender systems.2' By 1975, some 28 percent of American
counties, home to approximately two-thirds of the nation's popula-
tion, had indigent defender systems.22
Given the haste with which these systems were constructed and
the budget constraints they faced, it is not surprising that the initial
caseloads of indigent defense counsel working within these systems
were high.23 Professor Albert Alschuler, for instance, reported that
"in 1970, the average caseload per defender in New York City was
922 cases; in Philadelphia, defenders 'were carrying a caseload of
from 600 to 800 cases a year and often handled 40 to 50 cases a
day.' 24 Nor was the problem of excessive caseloads limited to
isolated jurisdictions: a 1978 study estimated that roughly one-third
of jurisdictions across the country reported caseloads that exceeded
nationally recommended caseload standards.25 In 1982, at hearings
capital cases. Id. at n.13.
19. See Nancy A. Goldberg, Defender Systems of the Future: The New National Standards,
12 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 709, 713 (1975) (noting that at the time Gideon was decided, indigent
defense "was a matter of judicial discretion and charitable contribution by bar associations
rather than a 'system"'). One difficulty was that, before Gideon, many counties required
lawyers to serve indigent defendants without either payment of fees or reimbursement for
expenses. See Laurence A. Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives
on Defense Services, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 667, 669 (1975).
20. See Benner, supra note 19, at 669. The indigent defense systems in 1961 served
approximately one-quarter of the population of the United States. Id. An indigent defender
system is defined as "a method of providing indigent defense services where an attorney or
group of attorneys, through a contractual arrangement or as public employees, provide legal
representation for indigent criminal defendants on a regular basis." Id.
21. See Note, Statewide Public Defender Organizations: An Appealing Alternative, 29
STAN. L. REV. 157, 157 n.3 (1976).
22. Benner, supra note 19, at 669.
23. Another factor exacerbating the caseload issues was that in 1975, roughly half of the
attorneys working in defender systems were employed on a part-time basis. See id. at 671.
24. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1248 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
25. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND
2007]
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before the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Legal Aid and Indigent Defense, a parade of witnesses complained
of the excessive caseloads that indigent defense attorneys routinely
handled.26
The emergence of excessive caseloads in the immediate aftermath
of Gideon is disturbing as a historical matter. Even more disturbing
is the fact that caseloads appear to have worsened. Just as one-third
of American jurisdictions failed to meet national caseload standards
in 1978,27 indigent defense caseloads today are no closer to staying
within those standards. In 1999, the 100 most populous counties in
the country handled just under 3.4 million criminal cases,2" and
public defenders were assigned in more than 2.7 million of them. 9
In addition, public defenders handled an additional 278,000 juvenile
cases and roughly 390,000 other cases.3 ° During the same period,
public defender offices in those same 100 jurisdictions employed
only 7,128 lawyers in litigation positions.3 Thus, each attorney was
assigned an average of 479 cases during that year. Even if all of the
PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING
F-1 (1982). Approximately 33 percent of the jurisdictions reported that they exceeded the
felony caseload standards, and 29 percent of the jurisdictions reported violating the
misdemeanor standards. Id. The report compared caseloads in all fifty states to the standards
set forth by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
Those standards recommend a maximum annual caseload of 150 non-capital felonies, 400
misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals. See NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON COURTS, standard 13.12 (1973), available at http://www.nasams.org/Defender/Defender
Standards/Standards_ ForTheDefense.
26. See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (1982), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/gideonundone.pdf
[hereinafter GIDEON UNDONE].
27. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 25, at F-1.
28. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999, at 5
(2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf. This figure under-
estimates the number of cases because it does not include some misdemeanor and appellate
cases. See id. at 8.
29. Id. at 5.
30. This category includes a wide range of civil and quasi-criminal cases such as mental
commitments, habeas corpus, abuse and neglect, contempt, paternity, and juvenile
dependency cases. Id.
31. Id. at 6. This figure includes assistant public defenders, chief public defenders, and
attorneys in managerial positions who litigate cases.
470
PRICE OF MISDEMEANOR REPRESENTATION
criminal cases were misdemeanors, so that all indigent defense
counsel were working exclusively on misdemeanor cases, that
number of cases significantly exceeds national caseload standards
of 400 misdemeanor cases annually.32 The reality, moreover, is that
a significant percentage of those cases very likely were felonies
rather than misdemeanors.33 The national standards provide that
counsel handling felony cases are limited to 150 felony cases per
year.34 In short, it is clear that more than forty years after Gideon,
caseloads of indigent defense counsel still remain shockingly high.
Reports concerning individual indigent defense systems across
the country support this view. One witness who testified before an
ABA commission in 2002 reported that annual caseloads in his
jurisdiction extended into the thousands.35 In 2003, public defenders
statewide in Minnesota handled more than 900 cases per attorney
per year.36 In 2001, a trial staff of fifty-two lawyers at the public
defender office in Hamilton County, Ohio, which encompasses much
of the Cincinnati metropolitan area, handled 34,644 cases, an
average of 666 cases per attorney. In Maryland in 2002, the public
defender office, which had not increased in size in five years,
reported that it would have to hire 300 attorneys just to meet
national caseload standards.3" In 1996, staff attorneys at the Office
of the Public Defender in Orange County, California maintained
32. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 25.
33. In addition, 278,000 of the cases were juvenile cases, see supra note 30 and
accompanying text, and national caseload standards limit attorneys to 200 juvenile cases
annually. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 25, standard 13.12.
34. Id.
35. See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEONS BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 17 (2004),
available at http://www.abanet.orglegalservices/sclaid/defenderlbrokenpromise/fullreport.pdf
[hereinafter GIDEOIfS BROKEN PROMISE] (quoting testimony of the Executive Director of the
New York State Defenders Association, stating that "[c]aseloads are radically out of whack
in some places in New York. There are caseloads per year in which a lawyer handles 1,000,
1,200, 1,600 cases.").
36. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1055-56.
37. See Nicole J. De Sario, The Quality of Indigent Defense on the 40th Anniversary of
Gideon: The Hamilton County Experience, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 43, 49 (2003).
38. See Lefstein, supra note 1, at 855.
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caseloads of 610 cases.39 In 2004 in Kentucky, public defenders
handled an average 489 cases per lawyer.4 °
The problem of excessive caseloads has been exacerbated by the
trend towards low-bid contracting for indigent defense services.
41
Although many jurisdictions now have established public defender
offices to represent indigent defendants, a significant number of
jurisdictions still put at least some of their indigent defense services
out for contract bids.42 There are different types of contract systems,
but one common variant is the flat fee system, under which
attorneys bid one flat fee to provide indigent defense representation
to all of the defendants who need lawyers that year, regardless of
the number of actual cases.43 Particularly in jurisdictions that
award these contracts to the lowest bidder, the system creates
terrible incentives. Lawyers have an incentive to bid low so that
they receive the contract. They then receive the same amount of
money regardless of how many defendants they represent or how
effectively they represent those defendants, thereby encouraging
them to use the fewest resources possible to provide the contracted-
for representation.44 Not surprisingly, the caseloads of at least some
of these indigent defense contractors, many of whom do indigent
39. See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
MD. L. REV. 1433, 1440-41 (1999). Caseloads of public defenders in that county were
drastically increased after the county required the office to provide representation even if the
office had a conflict. Id. at 1439-40.
40. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1057.
41. See AM. BARASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES,
standard 5-1.2 cmt. at 6 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/
providingdefense.pdf (noting that contract systems have "failed to provide quality
representation to the accused"); NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, LOW-BID CRIMINAL
DEFENSE CONTRACTING: JUSTICE IN RETREAT (1977), available at http:www.nacdl.org
INDIGENT/ind00006.htm (lamenting the rise of low-bid contracting for indigent defense
services); Paul Calvin Drecksel, The Crisis in Indigent Criminal Defense, 44 ARK. L. REV. 363,
381-82 (1991) (noting the trend toward use of contract systems and observing that these
systems fail to provide effective assistance).
42. See DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra note 28, at 3 (noting that in 1999, approximately 42
percent of the nation's largest 100 counties used contract attorneys).
43. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, 1999, at 5 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf (describing the different methods of providing indigent
defense representation).
44. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 41 ("Fixed-price contracts,
requiring representation of all cases, inevitably result in case overload and inadequate
representation.").
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defense work only part-time, reach into the thousands.45 In 1997
and 1998, for instance, a lawyer in California who employed only
two associates (one of whom had never tried a case before a jury)
received a contract requiring him to provide representation to more
than 5000 defendants per year.46
Excessive caseloads carried by indigent defense counsel lead
directly to deficiencies in representation, including policies of
encouraging guilty pleas to save resources.47 Over thirty years ago,
Professor Albert Alschuler observed that a public defender under
pressure from an enormous caseload who is trying to stay on top of
that caseload "must inevitably enter guilty pleas for most of his
clients, and as a public defender becomes attuned to his work, the
guilty plea may tend to become his almost instinctive response to all
but the most serious or exceptional cases. '4' That observation
remains true today. Overloaded indigent defense attorneys cannot
keep current with their caseloads unless the overwhelming majority
of their clients plead guilty.4"
Related to the practice of routinely obtaining guilty pleas is a
failure to investigate cases and to meet with clients.50 In many juris-
dictions, a practice known as "meet 'em and plead 'em" has become
45. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 13-15 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffilesl/bja/181160.pdf (detailing the caseload problems that can arise in contract
systems).
46. See id. at 1.
47. See generally Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise
of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625,
663-75 (1986) (detailing the problems caused by excessive caseloads).
48. Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1254.
49. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1082 (recounting story of a county in Indiana
in which two part-time contract attorneys were assigned a total of 2668 misdemeanor cases
in one year, and as a result only twelve of those cases-less than 0.5 percent-went to trial);
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 1, at 1509 (stating that "[a] lawyer working in a defender office
crippled by case overload candidly reported that prior to the increase in cases in her office, she
had conceived of her role as looking for the single issue that would give her client a plausible
argument to make in her defense. With case overload, that same lawyer now looked for the
one issue that she could identify to convince her client to resolve the case short of trial.").
50. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is
Chronic, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13, 15 (1994) ('CThe reality is that overburdened public defenders are
often forced to pick and choose which cases to focus on, resulting in the inadequate handling
of a large number of cases.").
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commonplace.5' Under that practice, criminal defendants enter
pleas of guilty on the same day they first meet with their attorneys.
Over a five-year period in a county in Mississippi, for instance, 42
percent of the cases involving indigent defendants charged with
felonies "were resolved by guilty plea on the day of arraignment,
which was the first day the part-time contract defender met the
client."52 Under these circumstances, it is impossible for a lawyer to
do any investigation of the case before recommending the plea, let
alone to do an adequate investigation.53
Finally, heavy caseloads lead to burnout among indigent defense
lawyers.54 This burnout adversely affects clients in two ways. First,
overburdened attorneys are much more likely to leave their jobs a
year or two after starting, creating offices that are bottom heavy
with inexperienced lawyers more prone to mistakes and inefficien-
cies in case management.55 Second, experienced attorneys often are
so demoralized by their inability to spend adequate time on their
cases that they are unable to exert the effort necessary even to
maintain contact with clients, let alone to provide effective represen-
56tation.
51. See GIDEONS BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 35, at 16 (explaining the practice in certain
jurisdictions where defendants plead guilty on the first day they meet their lawyers); Backus
& Marcus, supra note 1, at 1081-84 (noting that this practice occurs in jurisdictions across the
country).
52. GIDEoNs BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 35, at 16.
53. This lack of investigation also raises ethical concerns regarding whether the lawyer
is adequately discharging her duties to represent her clients with competence and diligence,
to be adequately prepared, and to be a zealous advocate on behalf of her client. See Backus
& Marcus, supra note 1, at 1081-84 (discussing the ethical problems of the "meet 'em and
plead 'em" practice).
54. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 81, 85-86 (1995) (arguing that "unconscionable caseload[s]" along
with other factors have led to burnout of public defenders); Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra
note 50, at 15 (noting that in a survey of public defenders conducted by the National Institute
of Justice, 76 percent said that excessive caseloads have led to attorney burnout).
55. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1851 (1994) (noting that indigent defense
systems "are unable to attract and keep experienced and qualified attorneys because of lack
of compensation and overwhelming workloads. Just when lawyers reach the point when they
have handled enough cases to begin avoiding basic mistakes, they leave criminal practice and
are replaced by other young, inexperienced lawyers who are even less able to deal with the
overwhelming caseloads." (footnote omitted)).
56. See Klein, supra note 1, at 393-94 ("The caseload crisis can devastate the morale of
often idealistic and dedicated attorneys."); Ogletree, supra note 53, at 85-86.
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In short, excessive caseload problems have continued unabated,
and in fact appear to have increased, in the years since Gideon was
decided, creating massive practical problems in the representation
of indigent defendants. Lawyers carrying caseloads that far exceed
national standards cannot adequately consult with their clients or
provide sufficient investigation. Ultimately, those attorneys fail to
provide adequate representation for most, if not all, of their clients,
despite the constitutional right of those clients to the effective
assistance of counsel.57
II. SOURCES OF THE CASELOAD CRISIS
The two propositions set forth in Part I-that indigent defense
counsel caseloads are unacceptably high and that the quality of
representation will continue to suffer until those caseloads become
more manageable-are relatively uncontroversial." The difficult
issue is how to solve the problem. Before turning to a proposed
solution, it is important to explore the factors that have given rise
to the current caseload crisis so that the solution addresses those
causes.
Two factors-the rise in total number of cases requiring
appointment of counsel and the inadequacy of indigent defense
budgets-have led to the current caseload crisis.59 As the total
number of cases has increased, budgets have remained relatively
static, and caseloads therefore have risen.' In the past twenty
57. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (providing that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel entitles a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of
counsel).
58. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1054-57 (detailing the problem of crushing
caseloads for indigent defense counsel); Klein, supra note 1, at 391-92 (identifying problems
caused by excessive caseloads); Lefstein, supra note 1, at 908 (identifying excessive caseloads
as one of the problems confronting indigent defense systems in this country); Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 1, at 1509 (recognizing that caseload caps are critical to quality
representation).
59. As discussed in Part I, in the years immediately following Gideon, indigent defense
caseloads exceeded national caseload standards. Achieving compliance with caseload
standards therefore requires that indigent defense funding increase at a rate greater than the
rate of increase in total number of cases. The fact that in the past twenty years, the increase
in funding levels has not come close to keeping pace with the increase in number of cases
means that the problem has only been exacerbated.
60. The interrelationship of total cases, budgets, and caseloads is somewhat complicated
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years, the total number of cases that have required state appointed
indigent defense counsel has increased dramatically.6 Although
budgets have increased to some extent during that same time frame,
the rate of increase has not come close to matching the increased
number of cases.
A. Providing Counsel to More Defendants: The Increasing Number
of Cases
In the past twenty years, the number of defendants receiving
state appointed counsel has increased between 100 percent and 200
percent because of three factors: (1) the Supreme Court's expansion
of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, (2) a steep rise
in the number of prosecuted cases, and (3) increased rates of
indigence within the universe of criminal defendants."
1. The Constitutional Standard: Broadening the Scope of the
Sixth Amendment
Although the Court made clear in Gideon that indigent criminal
defendants charged with felonies have a right to counsel, 3 it did not
resolve the question of whether the right to counsel extended
beyond felony cases to misdemeanors and petty offenses.64 A decade
later, the Supreme Court answered this question in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, holding that the constitutional right to counsel attaches in
all cases in which imprisonment is imposed, whether as a result of
a felony conviction, a misdemeanor conviction, or a conviction for a
by other factors and may not be perfectly proportional. For instance, in theory it would be
possible for an indigent defense system faced with a rising number of cases and a static
budget to reduce salaries of existing attorneys and hire more attorneys, thereby preventing
caseload increases. As a practical matter, however, the effect of a rising number of cases, in
the absence of any additional budget support, will lead to higher caseloads for each attorney.
61. See infra Part II.A.4.
62. In addition, the Court has expanded the right to counsel to require appointment at
earlier stages of the proceedings, including preliminary hearings where probable cause
determinations are made, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), and custodial
interrogations, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
64. See Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 103-04 (noting that lower courts were "sharply
divided" in determining whether Gideon applied only to felonies or also to non-felony
offenses).
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petty offense.65 To phrase it slightly differently, a sentence of
imprisonment for any period of time, whether a day or a year or
many years, is unconstitutional unless the defendant has been
afforded the right to counsel.6 6 Although a sentence of imprison-
ment, regardless of length, gives rise to a right to counsel, the Court
in Scott v. Illinois held that a potential sentence of imprisonment
does not require appointment of counsel.67 Thus, in spite of the fact
that Scott was convicted of a crime that carried with it a potential
sentence of up to one year in jail, the State's failure to appoint
counsel did not violate the Sixth Amendment because Scott was
sentenced only to a $50 fine.6"
The Court's decision in Argersinger has had an enormous
financial impact on states and counties-an impact arguably greater
than that of Gideon. Although most jurisdictions had been providing
counsel to indigent defendants charged with felonies before
Gideon, 9 the majority of jurisdictions were not providing counsel to
all defendants charged with misdemeanors before the Court's
decision in Argersinger. Before Argersinger, only nineteen states
provided counsel to indigent defendants in most misdemeanor
cases.7" An additional twelve states provided counsel at least to
some indigent defendants charged with offenses less serious than
felonies, but the remaining nineteen states did not provide counsel
in misdemeanor cases.71 Indeed, according to one estimate, at the
time Argersinger was decided, states were providing counsel in
690,000 indigent felony cases per year, but the Court's holding
required states to appoint counsel in as many as 2.7 million mis-
demeanor cases, excluding traffic offenses, per year.
7 2
Of particular significance, the Court's decisions in Argersinger
and Scott make it difficult to determine, at the outset of a case when
counsel generally is appointed, whether a particular misdemeanor
65. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1973).
66. Phrasing the right in this way eliminates the problem that one does not know, prior
to sentencing in any given case, whether the defendant has a right to counsel. See infra text
accompanying notes 72-75.
67. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
68. Id. at 368.
69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70. See Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 119-24.
71. Id. at 111-19.
72. See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 715.
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defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Other
trial rights guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment-such as the
right to trial by jury, which is based upon the nature of the offense
with which the defendant is charged,73 or the right to confrontation74
and the right to a public trial,75 which exist in all criminal
prosecutions-can be determined at the outset of a prosecution, or
at least prior to trial. Because the right to counsel depends upon the
sentence that ultimately is imposed, however, the court cannot
know with certainty at the outset of the case whether the defendant
has a constitutional right to counsel. For that reason, the right to
counsel essentially operates as a limitation on punishment: An
indigent criminal defendant cannot be sentenced to imprisonment
upon conviction unless he has been afforded the right to counsel.76
Until 2002, the Sixth Amendment precluded only sentences of
imprisonment for unrepresented misdemeanor defendants. This
rule limited the impact of Argersinger because a court could
impose any sentence on an unrepresented misdemeanor defendant
except for a term of incarceration. In other words, the court could
sentence the defendant either to probation or to a fine without
appointing counsel. Because so many misdemeanor and petty
offense convictions result in either probation or a fine, there were
many misdemeanor and petty offense cases in which the state was
not required to, and in fact did not, appoint counsel to indigent
defendants.77
73. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (holding that the right to jury trial
attaches if the defendant is charged with an offense that carries a potential penalty of more
than six months imprisonment).
74. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore is
applicable in all state court prosecutions).
75. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 (1948) ("[A]n accused is at the very least entitled
to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged.").
76. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1973) ("Under the rule we announce
today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment
may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by
counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore
know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.").
77. As discussed infra in Part III.B.1, some jurisdictions provide a statutory right to
counsel in all misdemeanor cases. In those jurisdictions, the state must provide counsel to all
indigent defendants unless the defendant waives that right. The statutory right to counsel in
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In 2002, however, the Supreme Court again dramatically
expanded the number of defendants who are entitled to state-
appointed counsel. In Alabama v. Shelton, the Court held that
essentially all indigent defendants sentenced to terms of probation
also are entitled to the appointment of counsel.8 In Shelton, the
defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment that was
suspended conditioned upon his successful completion of a term of
probation and payment of a fine.79 If the defendant successfully
completed probation, he was not required to serve any time in jail.
Although the defendant was never imprisoned, the Court held that
the imposition of a term of imprisonment, even if suspended, gave
rise to a right to counsel under the principle articulated in
Argersinger.°
The Court's ruling in Shelton has great practical significance
because, in almost every jurisdiction that authorizes probationary
sentences upon conviction of crimes punishable by imprisonment, a
sentence of probation "suspends" imprisonment conditioned on the
successful completion of probation.81 If the defendant successfully
completes probation, he never serves any period of incarceration.
If, however, the defendant violates probation, the court can re-
voke probation and impose either the term of imprisonment that
explicitly was suspended or, if the court did not specify the sus-
pended term of imprisonment, any term authorized for conviction of
the offense." Because every state ties its probation system to a
suspended sentence of imprisonment, 3 it follows that practically
other jurisdictions, however, essentially mirrors the federal constitutional right.
78. 535 U.S. 654, 658, 674 (2002).
79. Id. at 658.
80. Id. A probation term is enforceable through imprisonment if a judge has the power to
revoke probation and impose a term of imprisonment upon a determination that the
defendant has violated conditions of that probation. It is important to note that the Shelton
Court concluded that there is a right to counsel if the defendant is sentenced to probation, not
just if the defendant's probation is revoked. Id. at 662.
81. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.085 (2007) ("The court may, in its discretion, suspend
the imposition of sentence ... and shall place the person on probation ....").
82. See, e.g., id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1703.3 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206
(1972).
83. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 673 (noting concession of the state of Alabama that no state
has a probation system unconnected to a suspended sentence of imprisonment). As discussed
infra Part III.B.3, a state could create such a system, but it appears that no state has done
so yet.
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every indigent defendant convicted of a criminal offense punishable
by imprisonment s -whether a petty offense, misdemeanor, or
felony-has a right to appointed counsel unless he receives a
sentence of only a fine. The Court in Shelton anticipated that the
cost of its ruling would be minimal because many states already
required the appointment of counsel in cases covered by the new
rule. 5 In fact, however, more than half of the states did not provide
counsel to all defendants under these circumstances at the time that
Shelton was decided.'
The Court's expansion of the right to counsel to all cases in which
a sentence of either incarceration or probation enforceable through
imprisonment is imposed affects a large volume of cases. The vast
majority of cases filed in state and local courts each year are
misdemeanors. In 2001, for instance, just under 10 million misde-
meanor cases were filed in state courts across the country," four
times the number of felony cases filed that same year. 8 Although
there are no clear-cut data on the percentage of those defendants
who were sentenced to terms of probation, it appears that at least
20 percent of those cases, and probably many more, resulted in
84. If the offense does not carry with it any possibility of imprisonment, then there is no
constitutional right to counsel.
85. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668-69 ("Nor do we agree with amicus or the dissent that our
holding will ... encumber [states] with a 'large, new burden."' (internal citation omitted)).
86. See id. at 669-70 (noting that a defendant in Shelton's circumstances would not have
had a right to counsel in at least sixteen states, and an additional ten states did not provide
counsel in all of the circumstances covered by the Court's new rule).
87. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURT STATISTICS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002, at 54-55, 57 (2003), available at www.ncsconline.org/D_
ResearchlCSP/2002_Files/2002_StructureFulLReport.pdf. The misdemeanor figure excludes
driving while intoxicated cases because those are counted separately from both felonies and
misdemeanors.
88. See id. at 57. This report provides information on the percentage of cases by type of
court. Some jurisdictions have adopted a unified court system in which all criminal cases are
heard in the same court. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURT STATISTICS, COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1998, at 65-66 (1999), available at
www.ncsconline.orgDResearchlCSP/1998_Files/1998_Front.pdf. Other jurisdictions use a
two-tiered court system in which one court, known as the limited jurisdiction court, has
jurisdiction over all misdemeanors and only a select few felonies, while the general
jurisdiction court has jurisdiction over all criminal cases. In these two-tiered systems, the vast
majority of cases filed in limited jurisdiction courts are either misdemeanor cases or driving
under the influence cases, while the majority of cases filed in general jurisdiction courts are
felonies. Id.
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probationary sentences.8 9 In addition, although not all misdemeanor
defendants meet the financial requirements to require appointment
of counsel,90 it appears that at least half of them qualify as
indigent.9 The bottom line is clear enough: The Court's extension of
Gideon in Argersinger and subsequent extension of Argersinger in
Shelton has greatly expanded state governments' duties to appoint
counsel to represent misdemeanor defendants.92
2. Increased Number of Prosecutions
During the same time frame in which the Court has expanded the
constitutional right to counsel, the number of cases prosecuted in
state and local courts nationwide has exploded. In 2000, approxi-
mately 14.1 million criminal cases were filed in state courts across
89. See Brief of Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court at 18-20, Alabama v. Shelton,
535 U.S. 654 (2002) (No. 00-1214) (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics figures that in 2000,
"more than 1.7 million adults were on probation for misdemeanors" and estimating that there
were approximately 8.7 million misdemeanor cases filed in state courts in 1999).
90. Standards for determining who is indigent vary considerably across jurisdictions. See
RANGITA DE SILVA-DE ALWIS, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR
PUBLIC DEFENSE (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
indigentdefense/determinationofeligibility.pdf (presenting standards of the ABA and
seventeen states for determining indigence); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of
Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 572 (2005) (noting that because standards for indigence vary so
widely among jurisdictions, "Gideon means something different in Alabama than it does in
Florida").
91. See infra Part II.A.3.
92. There is evidence that at least some misdemeanor defendants who have a right to
counsel waive that right. See, e.g., Brief of the State of Texas, et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24-25, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (No. 00-1214) (noting
that some misdemeanor defendants in Texas waive the right to counsel). But see GIDEOPIS
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 35, at 23-25 (citing anecdotal evidence that many misdemeanor
defendants are not informed of their right to counsel). To the extent that indigent
misdemeanor defendants are not being informed of their right to counsel before waiving that
right, the state violates their constitutional rights if they are sentenced to either probation
or imprisonment. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (holding that waiver of the
right to counsel must be "knowing and voluntary"). Unfortunately, it is impossible to estimate
the extent to which such waivers are occurring. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The
Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2045, 2080-82 (2006) (noting that "precious little data exist on waivers of counsel in
misdemeanor cases" but estimating that roughly 40 percent of misdemeanor defendants in
North Carolina waived counsel). The fact remains, however, that the Supreme Court's rulings
in Argersinger and Shelton have resulted in an increase in the number of cases in which the
state is constitutionally required to appoint counsel.
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the country. 3 This figure represents a 46 percent increase over the
approximately 9.7 million filings in 1984. 94 The increase is at least
partially attributable to a sharp rise in the number of narcotics
prosecutions. 95 Indeed, in the five years from 1986-90, the number
of convictions in state courts for drug trafficking offenses doubled,
and by 1990, drug offenders constituted one-third of all people
convicted of felonies in state courts.96
From 1998-2001, the total number of criminal prosecutions
remained relatively stable, but new filings increased again in 2002
to reach 15.5 million cases, an increase of 60 percent over the 1984
levels. 97 Caseloads of courts that handle both felonies and misde-
meanors rose 43 percent from 1984-2000 and then rose again
between 2000 and 2002. 9' Of particular importance for present
purposes, the recent rise in case filings is attributable in large part
to increases in misdemeanor prosecutions. 99
3. Rising Rates of Indigence
Finally, the number of cases in which the state must appoint
counsel has increased because the percentage of defendants who are
93. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURT STATISTICS, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001, at 56 (2001), available at http://www.
ncsconline.org/D_-Research/CSP/2001-Files/2001_Structure_Full_Report.pdf. This figure
includes felony filings, misdemeanor filings, and filings of petty offenses.
94. See id. at 56-57. The total number of filings may overstate the number of criminal
cases in a given year. This is so because in some two-tiered jurisdictions, felony cases are first
filed in the court of limited jurisdiction and then once an indictment is returned, they are filed
in the court of general jurisdiction. Those cases therefore are reflected twice in the total
number of cases. See id. That fact notwithstanding, the number of cases still increased
steadily from the early 1980s until 1998. See id.
95. See Klein, supra note 1, at 398-99 (noting that the caseload crisis in New York and
nationwide was "precipitated in large part by the surge in the number of drug cases").
96. See OFFICE OF NATL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CRIME
FACTS, 1994, at 19 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dcfacts.pdf.
97. See NATL CTR. FOR STATE COURT STATISTICS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003, at 38, available at http://www.ncsconline.org
D_ResearchlCSP/2003_Files/2003_Full_Report.pdf.
98. See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001, supra note 93, at 56 (showing that
case filings in unified courts and courts of general jurisdiction rose 43 percent from 1984 to
2000).
99. See id. at 38 (noting that "most of the increase in criminal filings between 2001 and
2002 was due to an increase in limited jurisdiction court filings" which are primarily
misdemeanors).
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indigent has steadily risen over the years. In 1963, when Gideon
was decided, the rate of indigence was approximately 43 percent,100
and that figure remained close to constant for the next twenty
years. According to the Department of Justice, in 1982 roughly 48
percent of all defendants charged with felonies in state courts had
appointed counsel. 1' By 1998, however, 82 percent of felony defen-
dants prosecuted in state courts in the seventy-five largest urban
counties had state-appointed counsel.'0 2 Over a period of less than
twenty years, then, even without factoring in the Court's expansion
of Sixth Amendment rights and the increased number of cases
filed by prosecutors, indigent defense systems experienced a 70
percent increase in the number of felony defendants they had to
represent. 103
The percentage of misdemeanor defendants who are indigent also
appears to have increased, although less significantly. An accurate
calculation of the indigence of misdemeanor defendants is nearly
impossible because very little information exists about the financial
circumstances of misdemeanor defendants in state court. In 1996,
however, 56.3 percent of jail inmates charged with or convicted of
misdemeanors had court-appointed counsel.' 4 This figure repre-
sents at least a 20 percent increase over the rates of indigence of
misdemeanor defendants in 1973.15
100. LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE
COURTS: A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 7-8 (1965).
101. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL
DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 33 (1986).
102. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1
(2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
103. These statistics reflect the percentage of felony defendants who received state-
appointed counsel. Although there are fewer felony cases than misdemeanor cases, increases
in felony caseloads have a greater impact on the workload of indigent defenders than
increases in misdemeanor caseloads because felony cases are more time and resource
intensive than misdemeanor cases.
104. See HARLOw, supra note 102, at 6. This figure comes from a survey of misdemeanor
defendants in state and local jails. Some of those defendants were already convicted and
serving sentences; others were incarcerated pending trial. Incarcerated defendants might, in
fact, be more likely to be indigent than non-incarcerated defendants, but there simply are no
data on the indigence rates among misdemeanor defendants generally.
105. See Benner, supra note 19, at 668 (reporting that the average rate of indigence among
misdemeanor jail inmates in 1973 was 47 percent). It is important to note that comparing the
percentage of misdemeanor jail inmates who received counsel in 2005 and the average rate
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4. Overall Effects
The indigent defense system has experienced dramatic changes
as a result of the interplay of expanded constitutional rights, a
growing number of prosecutions, and increased indigence among
criminal defendants. Although a lack of data precludes precise
calculations of the increase in total number of cases assigned to
indigent defense counsel, it appears by a conservative estimate that
the number of cases more than doubled-and may even have
tripled-between the early 1980s and the beginning of this century.
By way of illustration, for every 100 criminal cases in 1984, roughly
20 of the cases would have been felonies, while the remaining 80
would have been misdemeanors.' ° Using the 1982 rates for
appointment of counsel, 48 percent of the felony defendants, or 9.6
felony defendants, would have been entitled to the appointment of
counsel. Similarly, 47 percent of the misdemeanor defendants, or
roughly 37.6 misdemeanor defendants, were indigent. 10 7 In 2005,
because of the increase in the number of cases prosecuted, the 100
cases from 1984 would become approximately 160 criminal cases.0 8
Of those 160 cases, approximately 32 would be felony cases and the
remaining 128 would be misdemeanor cases. The state would be
required to appoint counsel for 82 percent of the felony defendants,
or 26 felony defendants, and for 56 percent of the misdemeanor
defendants, or 72 misdemeanor defendants. 0 9
of indigence in 1973 may understate the increase in the appointment of counsel for
misdemeanor defendants. This is so because the 2005 figure measures the percentage of
defendants who actually received appointed counsel (excluding defendants who either waived
counsel or were not appointed counsel because they received only a fine) whereas the 1973
figure measures indigence of misdemeanor defendants regardless of whether they received
appointed counsel.
106. This assumes that the 1984 felony-to-misdemeanor ratio was approximately
equivalent to the ratio in 2000.
107. Although 47 percent of misdemeanor defendants were indigent in 1984, most of those
defendants probably did not have appointed counsel because Shelton had not yet been decided,
and misdemeanor defendants sentenced to probation did not have a right to counsel at that
time. This figure (37.6 misdemeanor defendants) therefore is likely overstated.
108. See supra Part II.A.2.
109. This figure assumes that all of the misdemeanor defendants receive sentences of
imprisonment or probation enforceable by incarceration.
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Thus, over the course of two decades, indigent defense systems
nearly tripled the number of felony defendants they had to repre-
sent. Moreover, although the increase in misdemeanor defendants
does not appear as steep, nearly doubling rather than tripling (from
37.6 defendants to 72 defendants), these figures do not account for
the increase in misdemeanor cases attributable to the Court's
expansion of the right to counsel in Shelton.110 If one were to include
those cases, it is quite possible that the increase in misdemeanor
cases requiring court-appointed counsel has also tripled.
B. Indigent Defense Budgets: The Failure To Keep Pace
Since 1980, indigent defense budgets nationwide have not come
close to keeping pace with the caseload increases described above.
In fact, when controlled for inflation, the amount of money spent per
defendant has significantly decreased over that period. In the years
immediately following Gideon, spending on indigent defense
increased sharply. Between 1970 and 1978, state and local funding
for indigent defense septupled, when controlled for inflation."' Part
of the explanation for that increase was that indigent defense
systems had not existed until the Court's decision in Gideon,12 and
the creation of those systems entailed significant costs. Even with
those increases, however, it was clear by the early 1980s that
indigent defense budgets were insufficient to provide adequate
representation. In 1982, the American Bar Association held a series
of hearings on the "Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding."'' 3 At the
hearing, witnesses noted that funding of indigent defense was
wholly inadequate, constituting only 1.5 percent of the total budgets
for criminal justice allocated by state and local governments." 4
Since that report was prepared, state and local expenditures for
indigent defense, after adjustments for inflation, have increased
roughly 50-75 percent. In 1982, state and local governments spent
110. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
111. See Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness:
Self-Selection by the "Marginally Indigent," 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225-26 (2005).
112. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
113. See GIDEONUNDONE, supra note 26.
114. See id. at 2 (summarizing the testimony of witnesses).
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approximately $1 billion on indigent defense." 5 As set forth in Table
1, in 2002, annual expenditures for indigent defense by state and
county governments had reached a figure close to $3 billion," 6 a
53 percent increase over the 1982 figure after adjustment for
inflation." 7 In 2005, the budget increased to just over $3.5 billion,
a 75 percent increase over the 1982 funding levels, again after
adjustment for inflation."8
Table 1: Indigent Defense Budgets for State and Local Governments
1982 budget 1982 budget 2002 budget 2002 budget 2005 budget
in in in in in
1982 dollars 2005 dollars 2002 dollars 2005 dollars 2005 dollars
$991,047,250 $2,005,620,000 $2,823,562,619 $3,065,268,780 $3,520,941,367
Another more-targeted study focused on indigent defense budgets
in the 100 most populous counties. 119 That study concluded that
indigent defense funding increased a little less than 50 percent
between 1982 and 1999. Expenditures on indigent defense in 1999
totaled approximately $1.2 billion. 120 That figure represents a 47
percent increase from the funding levels in 1982 when adjusted for
inflation. 12 1 The bottom line is that while the total number of cases
115. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT
DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/indigentdefexpend2003.pdf.
116. See id. at 2; Table 1 (concluding that state and county governments spent
$2,823,562,619 on indigent defense in fiscal year 2002).
117. Inflation was calculated according to the guidelines set forth by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics on its website at http://www.bls.gov/cpi (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (follow "Get
Detailed CPI Statistics" hyperlink to "Inflation Calculator" hyperlink). According to those
guidelines, inflation from 1982 to 2002 was approximately 86 percent.
118. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
sclaidldefender/downloads/FINALREPORTFY_2005_ExpenditureReport.pdf (noting that
state and county governments spent $3,520,941,367 on indigent defense services in fiscal year
2005). Inflation was calculated according to the guidelines set forth by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics on its website. See supra note 117. According to those guidelines, inflation from
1982 to 2005 was approximately 102 percent.
119. See DEFRANCES & LITRAS, supra note 28, at 5.
120. Id. at 1.
121. Id. Comparable data on indigent defense funding in 1982 were available for 50
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has risen from 100 percent to 200 percent since 1982, budgets for
indigent defense have increased only 50-75 percent after adjustment
for inflation.
III. FOCUSING RESOURCES ON SERIOUS CASES
Over the past twenty-five years, caseloads of indigent defenders
have borne the brunt of the rise in the number of cases requiring
court-appointed counsel. As a result of these increases, per-lawyer
caseloads in many jurisdictions now radically exceed accepted
standards.122 In an effort to respond to the rise in caseloads, public
defenders and other concerned citizens have urged governments to
increase indigent defense budgets so as to facilitate the hiring of
additional defense attorneys. 123 These efforts, however, have not
counties, and the funding of those same 50 counties in 1999 increased roughly 47 percent.
122. As discussed in Part IV, the most widely accepted caseload standards limit annual
caseloads to 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or
25 appeals. See, e.g., NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER AsS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, Guideline 5.1, at 12 (1976), available at www.nlada.org/DMS/
Documents/998925963.238/blackletter.doc [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
123. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 1, at 1096-1103 (arguing that an increase in
resources is necessary); Klein, supra note 47, at 681-92 (arguing that state bar associations
should commit lawyer registration fees to indigent defense); Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution,
Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 41-46 (1999) (arguing that
state legislatures should allocate more resources to fund indigent defense). In a variation on
that argument, some have advocated for implementation of caseload limits through litigation
so that states would be forced to allocate sufficient resources. See Klein, supra note 1, at 408-
30 (arguing for broad-based litigation strategies to rectify the indigent defense funding crisis);
Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex-Ante Parity Standard,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) (arguing that indigent defense counsel should
sue for resources equal to those allocated for prosecutor's offices). While litigation has been
successful in a few jurisdictions, it is a solution of last resort and is unlikely to be widely
successful as a mechanism to ensure funding for indigent defense nationwide. See
Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 50, at 51-52. Others have argued simply that states
must address the caseload crisis without identifying any sources of funding to implement
those solutions. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal
Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1199 (2003) (arguing that state disciplinary boards
should enforce ethics rules against indigent defenders but noting that funding is necessary
and that "[p]rosecutors, courts, and disciplinary agencies should strongly urge legislatures to
provide the necessary funding); Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional
Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 473, 533 (proposing ethical
standards for indigent defense attorneys, but acknowledging that this solution will not
eliminate the problem as long as there is inadequate funding). As discussed in Part IV, see
infra notes 177-214 and accompanying text, the flaw in that argument is that there is no
constitutional requirement that mandatory caseload limits be adopted or enforced, and states
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carried the day.14 In the face of countervailing political pressures,
real dollar budgets simply have not kept pace with the growing
number of cases in the indigent defense system.
There is, however, another option for dealing with the growing
caseload crisis because deficient budgets are only half the reason for
the problems now faced by indigent defense systems. The other half
lies in the rising number of cases requiring appointment of counsel.
In particular, indigent defense systems now direct extensive
resources to the appointment of counsel in relatively minor misde-
meanor cases.125 As a result, states could conserve resources by
eliminating representation in many of these cases. In order to do so,
states must first limit the right to court-appointed counsel to cases
in which the defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. Next,
they must reduce the number of cases that bring that right into
play.
The argument against denying a right to counsel in large
numbers of misdemeanor cases is that although this denial may not
have not adopted such limits in large part because of the cost factor associated with those
limits. It therefore is necessary to identify alternative ways to reduce caseloads.
124. See supra Part II.B.
125. As discussed supra in Part II.A, two other factors have led to an increase in the
number of cases entering the indigent defense system: (1) an increase in the number of cases
prosecuted, and (2) increased levels of indigence. States certainly could reduce the total
number of cases requiring the appointment of counsel by finding ways to limit these factors.
For instance, a state could pursue strategies to reduce the prosecution of cases by, for
example, allocating a fixed criminal justice budget to be split evenly between indigent defense
and prosecution. Cf. Wright, supra note 1, at 253-55 (arguing for equivalent resource
allocations for prosecution and defense attorneys). Such a system would require prosecutors
to be more selective in deciding which cases to prosecute.
A state also could increase the income cutoff level for indigent defense qualification. There
is some evidence that states already are pursuing this strategy. See Scott Wallace & David
Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 31 S.U. L. REv. 245,
272-73 (2004) (reporting that in a survey of indigent defenders, the standard most commonly
adopted was a standard related to client eligibility); Wright & Logan, supra note 92, at 2050
n. 11 (noting that "legislatures have shown a ready willingness to offset [the increases in types
of cases that give rise to a right to counsel] by lowering financial eligibility thresholds, thereby
shrinking the overall pool of mandated counsel appointments"). Although there has been some
suggestion that indigent defendants at the margins actually can afford to hire private counsel,
see Hoffman et al., supra note 111, at 250 (concluding that marginally indigent defendants
hire counsel if the charges are serious and they are innocent, but they use public defenders
if they know the risk of conviction is high), raising eligibility standards may well deny counsel
to defendants who are charged with serious offenses and do not have sufficient resources to
hire a lawyer-a result that is completely antithetical to Gideon.
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violate the Constitution, it violates the spirit of Gideon because
counsel can provide a benefit to misdemeanor defendants. The
empirical evidence suggests, however, that the appointment of
counsel in these cases may not provide a significant benefit. 2 '
Because the empirical evidence indicates that counsel play a
significantly less critical role in minor misdemeanor cases than they
do in felony cases, limiting appointment of counsel to felony and
more serious misdemeanor cases could relieve pressure on indigent
defense systems while violating neither the Sixth Amendment nor
the spirit of Gideon.
A. Empirical Evidence of the Limited Value of Counsel in
Misdemeanor Cases
The empirical evidence currently available supports the proposi-
tion that lawyers who are appointed in federal misdemeanor cases
provide no significant advantage to their clients. Indeed, pro se
misdemeanor defendants in federal court appear both to have lower
conviction rates and to receive more favorable sentencing outcomes
than represented misdemeanor defendants. Because of this, the
appointment of counsel in these types of cases may be less impor-
tant than in more serious cases. 2 '
Data are available on defendants in all misdemeanor cases filed
and terminated in federal court. 2 ' In 2000-2005, of the defendants
126. See infra Part III.A.
127. The appointment of counsel in minor cases may provide benefits to the indigent
defense system completely separate from the benefits provided to the client. In particular,
public defender offices in some jurisdictions use appointments in minor cases as training
ground for their most junior attorneys. Even with the proposals set forth below, however,
counsel still will be appointed in many misdemeanor cases. The primary difference is that
counsel will be appointed in far fewer misdemeanor cases.
128. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center,
http://fisrc.urban.orgtdownload/dtsheet.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (providing statistics
concerning defendants in federal criminal cases terminated in U.S. District Courts). Data
from fiscal years 2000-2005 were used for the analysis in this Article. The database records
type of counsel at the time of case termination which is defined as dismissal, acquittal, or
sentencing. Over the six-year period from 2000-2005, data were reported for 63,006
defendants in misdemeanor cases. Data on outcome were missing for 363 defendants, and
data on sentences were missing for an additional 93 defendants. Data on type of counsel were
missing for an additional 19,907 defendants. Thus, complete data for this analysis were
available for 42,643 defendants.
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for whom type of counsel was recorded, roughly 64 percent of all
defendants charged with misdemeanors represented themselves pro
se, 25 percent had appointed counsel,129 and 10 percent retained
private counsel. 3 ° As set forth in Table 2, the pro se defendants
were less likely to plead guilty and had a better chance of being
acquitted or having their cases dismissed than represented
defendants.
Table 2: Outcome by Type of Counsel
Guilty Nolo Dismissal Jury Bench Jury Bench
Plea Plea Trial Trial Trial Trial
Convicted Convicted Acquittal Acquittal
Pro Se 55.1% 6.1% 30.3% .02% 3.5% -- 5%
(27,191
cases) I








CJA 81.3% 4.9% 12.1% .5% 1.0% .1% .2%
(3,788
cases)'
Perhaps more importantly, pro se misdemeanor defendants in
federal court fared better than their represented counterparts in the
sentencing process. As set forth in Table 3, using a scale for
outcomes from zero to six, with zero representing the most favorable
outcome for the defendant (acquittal or dismissal) and six represent-
ing the least favorable outcome (a prison sentence), pro se defen-
129. Appointed counsel includes both public defenders and private counsel appointed under
the Criminal Justice Act.
130. Data analysis is available from the author. Data for type of counsel were missing in
approximately 32 percent of the cases.
131. "CJA" refers to attorneys appointed for indigent defendants under the Criminal
Justice Act.
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dants had a statistically significantly lower mean score than any
category of represented defendants. 3 '
Table 3: Mean Outcome Severity by Type of Counsel
Type of Counsel Mean Severity Score Mean Severity
Score Excluding
Dismissals
Pro Se 1.661 2.385
Retained Counsel 2.626 3.145
Public Defender 3.089 3.641
CJA Counsel 3.505 3.989
Of particular significance in Table 3 is the data establishing that
pro se defendants had the lowest mean outcome severity score even
if dismissals are excluded from the calculation. As is evident from
the data in Table 2, pro se defendants had much higher dismissal
rates than represented defendants. One potential explanation for
the abnormally high dismissal rate is that cases dismissed very
early in the proceedings are reflected as pro se if there has been no
opportunity for counsel either to be appointed or to enter an
appearance. Because such dismissals, which require no action on
the part of the pro se defendant, result in a lower mean severity
score for pro se defendants as a category, a mean severity score
excluding dismissals might more accurately measure the effect of
counsel. Table 3, in its final column titled 'Mean Severity Score
Excluding Dismissals," demonstrates that, even if dismissals are
excluded from the severity scoring, pro se misdemeanor defendants
still fare better than do represented defendants in all categories,
with a mean severity score of 2.385 as compared to the next lowest
score of 3.145.
One potential explanation for the fact that pro se defendants
score better than represented defendants in Table 3 is that unfavor-
able sentencing outcomes are more likely for defendants convicted
of more serious offenses, and pro se defendants may be more likely
132. For this analysis, the following scores were used: O=dismissal or acquittal; 2=fine;
3=probation; 4=suspended sentence; 5=split sentence; 6=prison. The most serious aspect of
the sentence was used for purposes of scoring, so if, for example, a defendant received a
sentence of both prison and a fine, that case would be scored as a six.
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to be charged with offenses that are less serious-in particular,
traffic cases-than represented defendants. In order to neutralize
the effect of the type of charge, the scores in Table 3 were standard-
ized by using a weighted average to estimate the score that
defendants in each representation group would have received if they
represented the average overall distribution of offenses. 133 As set
forth in Table 4, even when the scores are standardized in this way,
pro se defendants still score significantly better (although by a less
dramatic margin) than any other representation group, both when
dismissals are included and when dismissals are excluded.
Table 4: Standardized Outcome Severity by Type of Counsel
Type of Counsel Standardized Severity Standardized Sever-
Score ity Score Excluding
Dismissals
Pro Se 1.819 2.652
Retained Counsel 2.524 3.049
Public Defender 2.739 3.288
CJA Counsel 3.191 3.736
Finally, even if the mean outcome severity scores are separated
by type of offense, as set forth in Table 5, pro se defendants
consistently score better than represented defendants in all
categories in which there are sufficient data from which to draw
conclusions. 134
133. The overall offense distribution for all misdemeanor defendants is 29 percent traffic
offenses, 12 percent driving under the influence, 14 percent drug offenses, 7 percent fraud
offenses, 3 percent immigration offenses, and 34 percent other offenses. In order to obtain
these standardized scores, the scores for each type of counsel were broken down by offense
type, and those scores were weighted so that the total score for each representation type
reflects the score that group would have received if the offense distributions mirrored the
overall offense distribution.
134. The offense categories set forth in Tables 5 and 6 encompass roughly 65 percent of the
total cases in the database.
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Table 5: Mean Outcome Severity by Type of Offense
Type of Drug Driving Fraud Immigration Traffic
Counsel Offenses Under the Offenses Offenses Offenses
Influence
Pro Se 1.875 1.999 2.304 3.590 1.509
Retained 2.710 2.160 3.163 3.750 2.231
Counsel I
Public 3.272 2.385 3.360 4.298 2.400
Defender
CJA 3.774 3.324 3.883 4.809 2.621
Counsel
Similarly, as Table 6 illustrates, if dismissals are excluded from
these figures, pro se misdemeanor defendants perform better than
represented defendants when the outcome severity scores are
broken down by type of offense in all categories of cases except for
driving under the influence cases. In driving under the influence
cases, defendants represented by public defenders and retained
counsel score marginally better than pro se defendants. In all other
categories, however, pro se defendants score significantly better
than all other categories of represented defendants.
Table 6: Mean Outcome Severity Excluding Dismissals
Offense
by Type of
Type of Drug Driving Fraud Immigration Traffic
Counsel Offenses Under the Offenses Offenses Offenses
Influence
Pro Se 3.052 2.755 3.081 3.650 2.045
Retained 3.307 2.748 3.393 4.400 2.751
Counsel
Public 3.999 2.642 3.630 4.401 2.802
Defender
CJA 4.476 3.679 3.989 5.022 3.242
Counsel
The data certainly suggest that counsel in federal misdemeanor
cases do not have a meaningful impact on the ultimate outcome and
sentence of defendants. By contrast, counsel in federal felony cases
appear to provide some benefit to their clients. In a study of federal
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felony defendants, pro se defendants were more likely to be
convicted at trial than represented defendants.
135
These numbers are subject to limitations. The biggest flaw is that
the data concern only federal cases, and no comparable data are
available for state courts. 3 ' Because the vast majority of misde-
meanor defendants are prosecuted in state courts, this gap in
data is significant. Outcomes of federal misdemeanor defendants,
moreover, may not accurately represent outcomes of state court
misdemeanants. In particular, because there are relatively few pro
se federal court misdemeanor defendants, it is entirely possible that
federal judges make more accommodations to ensure that the rights
of those defendants are protected.17 With the higher volume of state
court misdemeanor defendants, state judges may not have the time
or resources to make those accommodations, and as a result, pro se
misdemeanor state court defendants may suffer more severe
outcomes than their represented counterparts. 38 To the extent that
the outcomes of federal court and state court pro se misdemeanor
defendants vary, the outcomes of the state court defendants are
more relevant for purposes of this Article than the outcomes of their
federal counterparts precisely because most misdemeanor cases are
prosecuted in state court.
135. See Erica Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423,
451-54 (2007) (concluding that pro se felony defendants in federal court go to trial at
significantly higher rates than represented defendants but that they are more likely to be
convicted at trial). Because so few felony defendants represent themselves, there was
insufficient data to analyze sentencing outcomes of pro se felony defendants. See id. at 441-43.
136. Data are collected for a sample of felony defendants in the seventy-five largest urban
counties. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT PROCESSING
STATIsTICS: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URGAN COUNTIES, 2002, at 4-5 (2006), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/fdluc02.pdf. The only comparable data for state court
misdemeanor defendants are based on survey samples from local jails, but some of those
defendants are still pending trial, and those data also exclude defendants charged with or
convicted of misdemeanors who do not receive sentences of imprisonment. See Wright &
Logan, supra note 92, at 2080 n.161.
137. The bench trial acquittal rates of pro se misdemeanor defendants appear to lend some
support to this theory. See supra Table 2 (demonstrating significantly higher bench trial
acquittal rates for unrepresented defendants).
138. Another reason that federal misdemeanants may not be representative of state
misdemeanants nationwide is that misdemeanor cases in federal court are concentrated in
jurisdictions that have federal military bases, Native American reservations, or other federal
land that gives rise to federal jurisdiction for crimes that otherwise would be prosecuted in
state courts. These factors also may have some influence on the outcomes.
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Although the lack of state data precludes any definitive conclu-
sions about the effect of counsel in misdemeanor cases, there are
data suggesting that the outcomes of pro se defendants in state
court may actually be better-rather than worse-than the out-
comes of their federal counterparts. In a study of felony defendants,
pro se defendants in state court had better outcomes than their
represented counterparts, while pro se defendants in federal court
had outcomes that were worse than represented federal felony
defendants." 9 The differential in the results of state and federal
felony pro se defendants may not be representative of the results of
state and federal pro se misdemeanor defendants, particularly
because the volume of pro se misdemeanor defendants in state
courts is so much greater than the volume of pro se felony defen-
dants in state courts. Nonetheless, there is no data to suggest that
pro se state court misdemeanor defendants enjoy lower success
rates than those of their federal counterparts.
The other major caveat to the conclusion presented above is that
it is possible that the cases against the pro se defendants are
significantly weaker or less serious than the cases against the
represented defendants. In other words, defendants with cases that
are more serious may be more likely either to retain counsel or to
request appointed counsel, whereas those defendants facing weaker
or less serious cases may be more likely to represent themselves. 4 '
The separate analysis of different types of offenses presented in
Tables 5 and 6 provides some reason to believe that this potential
critique lacks force. There is, however, no mechanism by which to
completely control either for the strength of the case against the
defendant or for the seriousness of the charge within the offense
type.14 1
139. See Hashimoto, supra note 135, at 447-54.
140. The opposite could also be true: Defendants may be more likely to hire counsel or ask
for counsel when the case against them is weaker because they believe there are more
arguments for counsel to make in the weaker case. Cf. Hoffman et al., supra note 111, at 224-
26 (arguing that marginally indigent felony defendants are more likely to hire counsel when
the case against them is weaker and use publicly appointed counsel when the case against
them is stronger).
141. See id. at 247 (noting that without interviewing attorneys, it is impossible to measure
the inherent strength of a case).
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Despite these cautions, it remains the case that, at least in
federal court, pro se defendants are achieving outcomes as good as,
and perhaps better than, represented defendants. Just as impor-
tantly, pro se misdemeanor defendants in federal court achieve
better results than felony pro se defendants in federal court. Thus,
the data suggest that the value added by counsel is lower in
misdemeanor cases than in felony cases.
B. Reducing the Appointment of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
If, as appears to be the case, counsel in less serious misdemeanor
cases do not have a particularly significant impact on outcomes and
sentencing, it makes sense to reallocate resources that otherwise
would be spent in support of counsel in those cases by eliminating
such cases from the caseloads of indigent defense counsel, thereby
redirecting such resources to the support of cases in which the
stakes are higher and the impact of counsel appears to be greater.
142
Although the Supreme Court has required appointment of counsel
in any case in which the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment
or a probationary sentence enforceable with the threat of imprison-
ment, 14 there are four ways that states can limit appointment of
counsel in minor cases. First, some states require appointment of
counsel to indigent defendants in all criminal cases, whether or not
appointment is required by the Constitution. To the extent that a
state is having difficulty meeting caseload standards, it should
change any such rule so that counsel is appointed only when the
defendant has a constitutional right to that appointment. Second,
states should take steps to identify minor crimes that currently are
punishable by imprisonment but for which an actual sentence of
imprisonment only rarely is imposed. For those crimes, states
should adjust the penalties so that imprisonment is not an available
142. It is undoubtedly true that misdemeanor cases are less resource intensive than felony
cases. See, e.g., NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 25 (estimating that the workload of 150
felonies is equivalent to the workload of 400 misdemeanors). Reducing the number of
misdemeanor cases in which counsel is appointed therefore has less impact on overall
workload than reducing an equivalent number of felony cases. The point remains, however,
that reducing the number of misdemeanor appointments will reduce caseloads and free up
resources for more serious cases.
143. See supra Part II.A.1.
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sentence. Third, states should revise probation schemes so that a
sentence of probation does not always or almost always give rise to
a right to counsel. States can achieve this result by, for instance,
punishing probation violations with contempt sanctions rather than
probation revocation. Finally, states should set up mechanisms to
ensure that, to the extent that imprisonment is an available penalty
for a misdemeanor offense, cases in which imprisonment is a
realistic option are identified early in the process and counsel is
appointed only in those cases. Taken together, these reforms would
result in a significant decrease in the number of cases requiring
appointment of counsel.'44
1. Amending Statutes To Require Appointment of Counsel Only
When There Is a Constitutional Right
The Constitution requires appointment of counsel in non-felony
cases only if an indigent defendant is actually sentenced to im-
prisonment, a suspended sentence, or probation enforceable by
imprisonment.'45 A number of states, however, currently require the
appointment of counsel even in minor cases punishable only by
fines.'46 If those states are not experiencing excessive caseload
problems, the appointment of counsel in these cases is non-problem-
atic, particularly given a criminal defendant's right to waive counsel
and self-represent.'47 If those states are experiencing caseload
problems, however, the resources spent to assign counsel in these
144. With the existing data, it is impossible to estimate the percentage of state and local
misdemeanor defendants who receive sentences of imprisonment upon conviction. An analysis
of the data on federal misdemeanor defendants from 2000-2005, however, demonstrates that
less than 10 percent of federal defendants charged with misdemeanors as the most serious
offense are sentenced to imprisonment. If state rates are anywhere close to comparable, this
means that very few misdemeanor defendants would have a right to counsel if these reforms
are adopted.
145. See supra Part II.A.1.
146. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4602 (2003) (providing a right to counsel to any
"indigent person who is under arrest or charged with a crime"); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-451
(West 2005) (providing a right to counsel in any case in which a fine of $500 or more is likely
to be adjudged); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321 (Vt. 1991) (interpreting title 13, section 5231 of
the Vermont Code to provide a right to counsel in all cases in which either imprisonment or
a fine in excess of $1,000 is imposed).
147. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that criminal defendants have
a constitutional right to represent themselves).
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minor cases-cases in which the impact of counsel very likely is
minimal and there is no risk of imprisonment-should be reallo-
cated to reduce the caseloads of attorneys handling more serious
offenses. 141
A number of other states require the appointment of counsel in all
cases in which the defendant is charged with an offense punishable
by imprisonment, even though the Court made clear in Scott 149 that
the mere potential for imprisonment does not give rise to a right to
counsel."5 ° Given the rules of Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton, and
the resulting dependence of the right to counsel at trial on post-trial
sentencing outcomes,15' it is understandable that states have
provided a statutory right to counsel in all cases in which imprison-
ment is a potential penalty. The difficulty is that a significant
percentage of those defendants will not actually receive sentences
of imprisonment. Appointment of counsel in those cases therefore is
not constitutionally required and may not be worth the cost. As set
forth below, there are steps that states can take to determine, prior
to appointment of counsel, whether a defendant charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment has a constitutional right to
counsel. If a state undertakes these reforms, it must amend relevant
148. Although the stakes of cases punishable by only a fine certainly are lower than the
stakes of cases punishable by imprisonment, the stakes still are higher than in civil cases. See
Wright & Logan, supra note 92, at 2079 (noting the consequences of misdemeanor
convictions). In particular, a conviction in a misdemeanor case, even if the right to counsel is
not afforded, can serve as a basis for enhancing a sentence upon a later conviction. See Nichols
v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 740-42 (1994) (holding that an uncounseled conviction can be
used to enhance a subsequent sentence). In addition, there may be immigration consequences
stemming from misdemeanor convictions, even if the defendant did not have a right to coun-
sel. See, e.g., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., DANGEROUS IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION PENDING
IN CONGRESS, available at http://www.ilrc.org/resources/hr4437 _general.pdf (last visited Oct
13, 2007) (summarizing immigration consequences of criminal convictions if H.R. 4437 were
passed). It also is true, however, that all of these consequences, in addition to a loss of liberty,
are threatened in more serious cases. To the extent that a resource allocation choice must be
made, the resources should go to those charged with offenses that will lead to imprisonment
in the event of conviction.
149. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
150. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-1 (1993) (providing a right to counsel to any indigent
person charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3(b)
(2000) (providing right to counsel in all criminal cases except those punishable only by a fine);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3902 (1990) (providing right to counsel for all indigent defendants
charged with felonies or misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment).
151. See supra Part II.A.1.
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statutes so that defendants have a right to counsel only when they
are constitutionally entitled to it-that is, when they actually
receive sentences of imprisonment or probation enforceable by
imprisonment.
2. Eliminating Imprisonment Penalties for Minor Offenses
Once states amend statutes to require appointment of counsel
only when required by the Constitution, they must next take steps
to limit the number of cases in which the Constitution requires such
appointments. The first step in that process is to eliminate impris-
onment penalties for minor offenses.
States take widely divergent approaches to the punishment of
minor crimes. In the state of New York, for example, minor traffic
offenses are punishable by imprisonment" 2 and counsel therefore
are appointed in many of those cases.'53 In other jurisdictions, these
crimes are punishable only by a fine, and the state is not required
to provide counsel.' Similarly, public intoxication,'55 possession of
an open container of alcohol,5 6 and possession of drug parapherna-
lia '57 are all punishable by imprisonment in some jurisdictions but
only by a fine in others. To the extent that a state is maintaining
imprisonment as an option for these minor offenses but using it only
rarely, there is little reason to incur the expense of appointing
counsel in all, or even many or some, of those cases. Instead, the
152. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw §§ 375.1(a), 375.32, 1180 (McKinney 2004).
153. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 115, at 3 ("Some states, by statute, require
counsel in minor misdemeanors, including traffic offenses, as these are treated as jailable
offenses.").
154. Id.
155. Compare IND. CODE §§ 7.1-5-1-3 (2001), 35-50-3-3 (1977) (defining public intoxication
as a Class B misdemeanor punishable by up to 180 days imprisonment and/or a fine of
$1,000), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.02 (Vernon 2001), 12.23 (Vernon 1994) (defining
public intoxication as a Class C misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $500).
156. Compare ALA. CODE § 32-5A-330 (2000) (defining possession of an open container of
alcohol in a motor vehicle as a Class C misdemeanor punishable by not more than a $25 fine),
with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1599 (1994) (providing that transportation of an alcoholic beverage
in an opened container is punishable by imprisonment of up to six months or a fine of $200
or both).
157. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-428 (1992) (providing that possession of drug
paraphernalia is punishable by a fine of not more than $100), with FLA. STAT. §§ 893.147
(2000), 775.082(4)(a) (2005) (defining possession or use of drug paraphernalia as a first degree
misdemeanor punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year).
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state should simply remove the possibility of imprisonment as a
penalty.'58 Defendants charged with those offenses would then no
longer have even a possible constitutional right to counsel, and the
state could cease appointing counsel in all such cases.'59
To be sure, there may be certain subcategories of particular
offenses in which imprisonment is imposed with frequency, but
states could easily take those circumstances into account when
setting penalties. For instance, a jurisdiction could provide that
certain offenses are punishable only by a fine unless the state
proves that the defendant is a repeat offender after giving notice of
that allegation prior to trial. 6 ' This approach would have the
benefit of reserving exceptional treatment for exceptional cases.
Eliminating imprisonment penalties for non-exceptional minor
offenses would not impose significant burdens on the administration
of justice if those penalties are being used only infrequently, and
such action could result in significant resource savings for indigent
defense systems.
3. Amending Probation Statutes
Most indigent misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to
probation have a right to counsel.' 6 ' This is so because in virtually
every jurisdiction, a defendant who is sentenced to probation is
subject to imprisonment if he violates the conditions of his probation
and a judge revokes that probation.'62 If the defendant is unrepre-
sented in the case that gives rise to the sentence of probation, that
158. Removing imprisonment as a sentencing option also removes the possibility of
probation enforceable through imprisonment, and defendants charged with those offenses
therefore would have no right to counsel.
159. A state also could choose to decriminalize these offenses. See Backus & Marcus, supra
note 1, at 1125 (recommending that states decriminalize non-serious misdemeanors to ease
crowded court dockets). Lowering the penalties for these offenses rather than completely
decriminalizing them may, however, be a more palatable option for legislators.
160. For purposes of determining whether there is a right to counsel, the notice provision
is critical, since absent notice by the state that the defendant is a repeat offender, the
maximum penalty would be a fine and the defendant would not be entitled to the appointment
of counsel.
161. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 654 (2002).
162. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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sentence is unconstitutional even if the state provides counsel prior
to the revocation of probation.'
Although most states currently use probationary schemes in
which probation is enforceable through imprisonment, such a
scheme is not necessary for the effective administration of proba-
tion in many cases. To the extent that states want to preserve the
option of sentencing defendants to probation without incurring an
obligation to appoint counsel, they should amend those statutes so
that probation can be enforced only through contempt proceedings
or at hearings in which there is an opportunity to reopen the finding
of guilt. 6
4
The Supreme Court in Shelton certainly suggested that the
former system-probation enforceable only through contempt-
would not give rise to a right to counsel.'65 Under this scheme, a
defendant who is convicted of a misdemeanor could be sentenced to
a term of probation even if not afforded counsel. If, however, the
defendant were alleged to have violated a term or condition of
probation-if, for instance, the defendant were rearrested on a new
offense-the court could not revoke probation and impose a sentence
of imprisonment. Instead, imprisonment could be imposed only if
the court adjudicated the defendant guilty of contempt for his
failure to abide by the terms and conditions of his probation. 66
The latter system-allowing the defendant to reopen the adjudi-
cation of guilt at the probation revocation hearing-may raise more
serious constitutional questions. Under such a system, a state could
sentence a misdemeanor defendant to a term of probation without
affording the right to counsel. Before the defendant's probation
could be revoked and imprisonment imposed, however, the defen-
dant would have a right to reopen the question of whether he was
163. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 667-68.
164. A state also could utilize a pretrial probation program without appointing counsel. See
id. at 671. Under such a program, a defendant would agree to complete a term of probation
prior to adjudication of the case, and upon successful completion of that term of probation, the
case would be dismissed.
165. See id. at 672-73. A sentence to a term of probation under such a system would be
equivalent to a fine-only sentence which does not give rise to a right to counsel, as per the
Court's holding in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979), but which can be enforced
through criminal contempt proceedings.
166. The defendant would be entitled to the appointment of counsel at the contempt
hearing before the court could impose a sentence of imprisonment.
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guilty of the offense in the first instance.167 Although the Court at
least suggested that it was leaving open the question of whether an
uncounseled probationary sentence could be imposed if there were
some mechanism to relitigate the defendant's guilt or innocence at
the probation revocation stage, 168 the Court ultimately might rule
that such a scheme is unconstitutional. 169 For that reason, a state
seeking to reserve probation sentences as an option without
triggering the right to counsel likely should amend probation
statutes to utilize contempt proceedings.
4. Requiring Judicial and Prosecutorial Triage
Finally, states should take steps to determine at the outset of
cases whether appointment of counsel is constitutionally required
and to appoint counsel only in those cases. The Supreme Court has
not made that task easy since it is often difficult to determine at
the outset of a case whether a defendant charged with a misde-
meanor will be sentenced to imprisonment. 70 Nonetheless, there
are steps that a state can take to minimize the appointment of
counsel when no duty to have done so will be triggered at the
sentencing stage. Most defendants charged with misdemeanor
offenses that are punishable by imprisonment do not actually
receive imprisonment sentences.' 71 Instead, many are sentenced to
probation or fines.'72 The challenge is to determine at the outset of
the case which of the defendants are most likely to receive imprison-
ment sentences if they are found guilty.
167. As with the contempt hearing, the defendant would have a right to counsel at the
probation revocation hearing before the judge could imprison the defendant.
168. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668 n.5 (concluding that the Court did not have to "decide
whether or what procedural safeguards 'short of complete retrial' at the probation revocation
stage could satisfy the Sixth Amendment" because Alabama did not have any mechanism for
revisiting the guilt or innocence of the defendant at a probation revocation hearing).
169. See id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that although "the Court at one point
purports to limit its decision to suspended sentences imposed on uncounseled midemeanants
in States, like Alabama, that offer only 'minimal procedures' during probation revocation
hearings, ... the text of [the majority's] opinion repudiates that limitation").
170. See supra Part II.A.1.
171. See supra note 144 (noting that less than 10 percent of federal misdemeanor
defendants are sentenced to imprisonment).
172. This discussion assumes passage of the reforms suggested in Part III.B.1, supra, so
that sentences of probation do not give rise to a right to counsel.
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Because the point is to prevent the appointment of defense
counsel unless there is a constitutional right to counsel-that is,
unless the defendant will be imprisoned-either the judge or the
prosecutor or both should seriously assess that likelihood at the
outset of the case. There are a number of mechanisms that a state
could enact to assure that prosecutors and/or judges make these
determinations explicitly. For instance, a state could provide that
imprisonment is not available as a penalty for certain misdemeanor
offenses unless the prosecutor files a notice at the defendant's first
appearance.173 If no notice is filed, the defendant could not be
sentenced to imprisonment and there would be no right to counsel.
Alternatively, the legislature could provide guidance for judges
charged with making determinations regarding the right to counsel.
In Argersinger, the Supreme Court clearly anticipated that judges
would make these types of determinations at the outset of the
case.'74 The difficulty has been that it does not appear that judges
have been given much, if any, guidance for making those determi-
nations. Instead, judges appear to make these decisions on an ad
hoc basis. Explicit guidance from a legislature regarding the cir-
cumstances under which imprisonment should be imposed for
particular offenses, or classes of offenses, would provide judges with
a mechanism to assess the likelihood that a particular defendant is
entitled to appointment of counsel. 75 Under such a system, a judge
would make a preliminary determination regarding the likelihood
of an imprisonment sentence under those guidelines, and make a
decision on appointment of counsel accordingly. 6
173. Although there is some risk that prosecutors will routinely file such notices in all
cases, prosecutors in many jurisdictions know that they will not request imprisonment in the
vast majority of cases and will be willing to put that on the record.
174. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1973) ("Under the rule we announce
today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment
may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by
counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore
know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.").
175. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.20 to 1340.23 (2005) (setting forth presumptive
punishments for misdemeanors based upon the class of misdemeanor and the prior record of
the defendant).
176. As Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurrence inArgersinger, judges in bench trials
should not be made aware of a defendant's prior criminal record. 407 U.S. at 41-42 (Burger,
C. J., concurring). In bench trial cases, some other screening mechanism therefore may need
to be adopted so that the trial judge does not hear of the defendant's prior record. For
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IV. THE IMPERATIVE FOR MANDATORY CASELOAD CAPS
If adopted, the reforms proposed above will result in a reduced
number of cases requiring appointment of counsel and thus should
result in lower caseloads for indigent defenders. That correlation,
however, assumes that budgets at the very least will remain stable
in inflation-adjusted dollars. If budgets decrease, the reduction in
total cases will not necessarily have any effect on the current
caseload crisis. In order to ensure that these reforms actually result
in reduced caseloads, it is necessary for states to adopt caseload
limits. In addition, to be effective, caseload limits must incorporate
enforceable, numerical mandates.
Historically, there have been no, or very few, mandatory caseload
limits.'77 This is so because the Court has not imposed any constitu-
tional limitation on the number of defendants that indigent defense
counsel may represent. In this environment, states have had little
incentive to take on this additional obligation. Even states that have
adopted caseload standards have for the most part recommended,
rather than required, compliance.
Maximum caseload standards have existed since the early
seventies."' In 1973, in response to concerns about excessively high
indigent defender caseloads, the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals ("NAC"), a commission of the
Department of Justice charged with evaluating key aspects of the
administration of justice, issued recommendations on caseload
limits for indigent defense counsel.'79 The per-attorney standards
it set were numerical in nature-namely, maximum annual case-
loads of 150 felony cases, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200
mental health cases, or 25 appeals.8 0 Although these standards
instance, one judge could make all of the appointment determinations.
177. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 125, at 250.
178. See id. at 269, 278.
179. See NATL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 25.
180. Id. These standards refer to the number of cases defense counsel should handle
annually, rather than the number of cases that should be open at any given time, and they
were intended to be alternative, rather than aggregated, maximums. Id. Thus, under the
standard, a lawyer can handle 150 felonies annually, but if she does, she cannot then handle
any additional cases of any type.
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have been the subject of some criticism over the years,"' they
have gained widespread acceptance as absolute maximum limits
for indigent defenders, 8 2 and they remain the benchmark fre-
quently cited and relied upon to this day. In 1989, for example, the
American Bar Association's Special Committee on Criminal Justice
in a Free Society adopted the NAC standards, with the single
exception that it reduced the maximum number of misdemeanors
from 400 to 300 cases per year.'83 In 2002, the American Bar
Association adopted a resolution recommending that indigent
defense systems comply with the NAC standards.18
Despite the existence of these standards and the almost uniform
agreement that some form of caseload standard is necessary,'85 the
Supreme Court has never intimated that the Constitution requires
states to adopt such standards. The Court has held that the state
must provide not only the assistance of a lawyer but also the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 86 however,
the Court declared that a failure to provide "adequate legal assis-
181. There are two types of criticism of the NAC standards. First, there are those who
question whether caseload limits in the NAC standard represent manageable caseloads. See,
e.g., Mounts, supra note 123, at 483 n.53 (noting that the caseload limits in the NAC standard
appear to have come from an earlier estimate that was based only on a "crude survey of
present practice" rather than on any more critical analysis or empirical evidence). Second,
there are those who question whether flat caseload standards are effective because they do
not take account of either the variation in complexity of cases within particular categories or
other time-consuming activities such as travel. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 8 (2001) (recommending that
workload limits be set, rather than caseload caps). Despite these criticisms, the NAC
standards have served as the basis of more state caseload standards than any other
standards. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 122 (stating that caseloads should reflect NAC
standards).
183. See AM. BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INA FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS 43 (1989).
184. See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, THE
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, princ. 5 (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaidlindigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf
(providing, as part of Principle 5, that "[n]ational caseload standards should in no event be
exceeded" and citing to the numerical caseload limits contained in the NAC standards).
185. On this point, it is significant that while those in the defense community certainly
have called for caseload or workload standards, see, e.g., NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
ASS'N, INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS AND COMMON SENSE, AN UPDATE (1992), the Justice
Department also supports that view, having commissioned a study recognizing that some form
of standards must be implemented, see THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 181, at 8.
186. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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tance" existed only if, in the case at hand, the defendant's lawyer
"made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and
this "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." '187
It was under the first part of this standard, the so-called deficient
performance prong, that the Court had the opportunity to set a
measurable test for effective assistance, including a standard
regarding defense counsel caseloads. Instead, the Court required
that in order to establish a constitutional violation, the defendant
must "show that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." '188 In deeming the adoption of a more
specific standard unjustified, however, the Court relied on "the legal
profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary
process that the [Sixth] Amendment envisions."18 9 The Court also
noted that "[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in [the]
American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides to
determining what is reasonable."190
Following Strickland, the Court has looked to American Bar
Association (ABA) standards-outside the caseload context-to
determine whether counsel violated Strickland's "objective standard
of reasonableness," particularly when assessing the adequacy of
counsel's investigation.191 Thus far, however, the Court has not
acknowledged the existence of NAC or ABA caseload standards, let
alone required states to comply with them.
In the absence of a constitutional duty that states implement
caseload caps, few jurisdictions have imposed them.192 To be sure,
187. Id. at 687.
188. Id. at 688.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (invoking the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice in concluding that counsel's failure to investigate constituted deficient
performance); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (citing ABA standards in concluding
that counsel's investigation constituted deficient performance); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 396 (2000) (citing ABA standards in determining that counsel's failure to investigate
defendant's background did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness).
192. There is, of course, a limit to the amount that caseloads can increase. At some point,
in the face of a rising number of cases and in the absence of budget increases, caseloads will
become so high that the system will cease to function. Until the system reaches that breaking
point, however, there is no imperative for state or local budgets to respond to the pressures
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a handful of states have endorsed some form of caseload standards
for public defenders by way of rules adopted by public defender
commissions, legislatures, or judicial decree.'93 The problem with
these standards, however, is that they typically operate only as
recommendations and there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure
compliance with them, even if they purport to have some measure
of binding effect. For instance, the State Board of Public Defense
in Minnesota adopted caseload limitations in 1991.194 Those
limitations, however, were characterized as a "goal," and the Board
adopted no enforcement provisions to ensure compliance.'95 Thus,
although the "actual caseloads carried by [attorneys in one district]
far exceeded" those standards, there was no recourse for public
defenders in that jurisdiction.'96 Similarly, the Georgia Public
Defender Standards Council has adopted the caseload limitations
contained within the NAC standards.' 97 The Georgia standard
specifies that it "is not a suggestion or guideline, but is intended to
be a maximum limitation on the average annual case loads of each
lawyer employed as a public defender."' 9 Although the standard
purports to define an absolute maximum limitation, it provides no
mechanism for enforcement of the cap. Thus, if a public defender in
Georgia has a caseload that exceeds this maximum limitation, there
is no recourse either for the defender or for the defender's clients.
The type of standards adopted in Minnesota and Georgia reflect
a clear advance over preexisting regimes that left attorney case-
loads free of any regulation. They also improve significantly upon
amorphous standards that speak of maintaining "reasonable"
caused by excessive caseloads.
193. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 181, at 11-13 (listing jurisdictions that have
adopted caseload standards).
194. See OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZ., STATE-BY-STATE
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM WORKLOAD STANDARDS, available at http://www.pubdef.
maricopa.gov/consults/finalrpt/Appd.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2007) (citing MINN. STATE PUB.
DEFENDER, CASELOAD STANDARDS FOR DISTRICT PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN MINNESOTA (1991)
(setting forth annual caseload maximums of 120 felonies or 400 misdemeanors)).
195. See Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn. 1996).
196. See id. (concluding that public defender has no cause of action despite excessive
caseloads).
197. See Ga. Pub. Defender Standards Council, Standard for Limiting Case Loads and
Determining the Size of Legal Staff in Circuit Public Defender Offices, http://www.gpdsc.com/
cpdsystem-standards-limitingcaseloads.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
198. See id.
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caseloads.'99 Effectively unenforceable numerical standards, how-
ever, have not solved caseload problems in most jurisdictions.200 In
Louisiana, for example, recommended caseload standards were put
in place in 1995,21 but six years later, public defenders still had
caseloads that exceeded those standards by a multiple of three and
exceeded NAC standards by even more.20 2 Similarly, although the
Washington Defender Association has adopted caseload standards
modeled on the NAC benchmarks, 203 caseloads continue to far
exceed the state's numerical targets.2°
In order for caseload standards to have a meaningful impact, they
must both include some numerical limit and provide a mechanism
for enforcement to ensure strict compliance. Indiana's experience
illustrates this point. 20 5 Although indigent defense in Indiana is
provided at the county level, the state reimburses counties for a
percentage of their indigent defense costs, and it is through that
199. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 125, at 276-77 (reporting that a survey of indigent
defense systems revealed that "[wihere the workload standards contained numerical caseload
or workload limits ... the likelihood of the standards having the actual effect of controlling
workload" more than doubled over the likelihood of success where the standards were not in
numerical form).
200. See, e.g., Hon. Sylvia R. Cooks & Karen Karre Fontenot, The Messiah Is Not Coming:
It's Time for Louisiana to Change Its Method of Funding Indigent Defense, 31 S.U.L. REV. 197,
208-09 (2004).
201. See LA. INDIGENT DEF. BD., LOUISIANA STANDARDS ON INDIGENT DEFENSE (1995),
available at http://www.lidab.com/Acrobat%20files/Chapter%201.PDF (setting caseload
standards similar to the NAC standards but with higher caseload limits).
202. See Cooks & Fontenot, supra note 200, at 208. This study was done prior to Hurricane
Katrina. The situation for indigent defense in Louisiana post-Katrina has gotten even worse.
See Fritz Esker, Many Post-Katrina Problems Face Orleans Parish Criminal Court System,
NEW ORLEANS CITY Bus., May 22, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi qn4200/is_20060522/ai_n16411995.
203. See Wash. Defender Ass'n, Standards for Public Defense Services, Standard Three:
Caseload Limits and Types of Cases, available at http://www.defensenet.orgresources/
standards/wda-standards-for-public-defense-services/standard-three-caseload-limits-and-
types-of-cases/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (setting forth caseload limits based upon the NAC
standards with the exception that misdemeanors are limited to 300 cases).
204. See Lefstein, supra note 1, at 854 (quoting the chief judge of the King County Superior
Court in Seattle, Washington, who said that although Washington has adopted caseload
standards, "caseloads in many jurisdictions far exceed this standard").
205. See generally Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases:
The Indiana Experience and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495 (1996).
Massachusetts provides another example of the success of mandatory caseload and workload
standards. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 125, at 317-26 (detailing the success of the
Massachusetts system).
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reimbursement structure that the state enforces caseload limita-
tions.2 °6 There are two sources for caseload standards in the state of
Indiana. The first, adopted by court rule, applies only in capital
cases.211 It strictly limits the number of felony cases and trials that
counsel appointed in capital cases can maintain. 2" These caseload
limitations are mandatory, and if a county violates the rule, the
state can refuse to reimburse the county for the representation
provided.20 9 Not surprisingly, in light of the economic incentive the
state provides, Indiana counties are in 100 percent compliance with
the capital case standard.210
Caseloads in non-capital cases are governed by rules promulgated
by the statewide Indiana Public Defender Commission, and again
the existence of enforcement mechanisms has been necessary to
successfully implement numerical standards. 21' As originally struc-
tured, Indiana's non-capital case guidelines called for only voluntary
compliance. The result, not surprisingly, was that no county in the
state met the Commission's numerical standards.1 2 Thereafter,
Indiana altered its non-capital case rules to mirror its approach to
capital cases by conditioning reimbursements to counties for felony
representation on compliance with numerical caseload rules. 213 As
206. See Lefstein, supra note 205, at 501-03.
207. See IND. CRIM. R. 24 (providing limitations on caseloads while capital case is pending
and prohibiting appointment of new cases in the thirty days preceding the capital trial).
208. See id.
209. See Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 715-17 (Ind. 2001). There was also some
suggestion in Prowell that violation of the standard was at least relevant to a determination
of whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. See id.
210. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 125, at 292 (noting the 100 percent compliance
rate). Compliance with those standards has been credited with improving the quality of
representation in capital cases, and since the passage of Rule 24, appellate courts have been
less likely to find that defense counsel was ineffective in capital cases. See Lefstein, supra
note 205, at 508-09.
211. See IND. PUB. DEFENDER COMM'N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN
NON-CAPITAL CASES 14-16 (2006), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/pdc/docs/
standards/indigent-defense-non-cap.pdf (requiring that the county public defender board
adopt a comprehensive plan that ensures counsel are not assigned excessive caseloads and
providing recommended caseload guidelines modeled upon the NAC standards, but providing
some variation depending on the level of investigative, legal, and administrative support the
indigent defender has).
212. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 125, at 292 (noting that when compliance with the
standards was voluntary, none of the counties were in compliance).
213. See id. at 282-83 (explaining Indiana's reimbursement provisions). The state
reimburses counties for 40 percent of the cost of representation for felony cases, and for 50
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a result, many Indiana counties now comply with those caseload
standards.214 In contrast to the caseload compliance achieved in
felony and capital cases, compliance with misdemeanor caseload
standards has been spotty at best. This can be explained in large
part by the fact that the state does not provide any reimbursement
to counties for representation of misdemeanor defendants.215
Lacking any enforcement mechanism for the misdemeanor caseload
standards, the state has been unable to replicate the high rate of
compliance it has achieved with regard to felony cases.
The key point is clear: Mandatory caseload caps achieve reason-
able caseloads much more effectively than do voluntary caseload
standards. Moreover, to work effectively, mandatory caps must
include two key features. First, they must contain some form of
numerical limitation, rather than requiring "reasonable" caseloads
or caseloads that are "not excessive."2 6 These numerical caps could
take the form of maximum caseload caps such as the NAC stan-
dards,21 7 or they could take the form of case-weighted workload caps
percent of the cost of representation in capital cases. See id.
214. See id. at 286-87 (noting that 50 of Indiana's 92 counties have opted to receive state
funding and are in compliance with the felony caseload limitations and reporting that
Vanderburgh County, Indiana is in strict compliance with the felony caseload limitations
because officials there "understand that the state Commission monitors caseload data closely
and that exceeding the limits will jeopardize the state reimbursement"); see also THE
SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 181, at 13 (noting that 42 of Indiana's 92 counties were in
compliance with caseload standards in 2000).
215. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 125, at 287-88 (noting that although counties work
to comply with felony caseload standards, misdemeanor caseloads exceed the state standards
"by a margin of up to 97 percent").
216. See id. at 276-77 (reporting that a survey of indigent defense systems revealed that
"[w]here the workload standards contained numerical caseload or workload limits ... the
likelihood of the standards having the actual effect of controlling workload" more than
doubled over the likelihood of success where the standards were not in numerical form).
Indeed, indigent defense attorneys arguably are already subject to non-numerical caseload
limitations in the form of ethical rules requiring diligence, thoroughness, and adequate
preparation in the representation of a client. See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent
Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1195-98 (2003) (arguing that
defense attorneys operating with excessive caseloads violate the rules of professional conduct
even if no disciplinary proceedings are brought against them). Those standards, however,
have proven woefully inadequate at solving the caseload problem. See id. (noting the lack of
enforcement of the rules in this context).
217. The NAC-modeled maximum caseload limitation is by far the type of standard most
frequently used to control caseloads. In adopting limitations based on the NAC standards,
states have varied the numbers somewhat, but the basic breakdown by case type has
remained resilient. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 181, at 8.
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that assign varying weights to cases depending on the type of case
and other workload factors.218 Either way, the important point is
that states adopt some numerical limit.
219
Second, numerical caseload limitations must be enforceable in an
effective way. There are a variety of enforcement mechanisms that
states can utilize, and the proper mechanism very likely will depend
on the way in which the state provides indigent defense services.
For jurisdictions in which indigent defense services are provided
and paid for at the local level with reimbursement from the state,
Indiana's model of withholding reimbursement if counties fail to
comply with caseload limitations makes good sense. Withholding
funds as a mechanism to ensure caseload compliance also should
work well in jurisdictions where indigent defense providers enter
into contracts with the state to provide defense services.22
States might also ensure compliance with caseload standards by
empowering indigent defense counsel to protect their own clients'
interests. For instance, a jurisdiction could give indigent defenders
the right to refuse to accept additional cases if caseloads reach
specified limits, or to withdraw from cases if caseloads exceed the
limit. 21 This mechanism will work, however, only if the attorney
has an incentive to enforce these limitations. In particular, it is far
more likely to result in compliance with caseload limits in jurisdic-
tions that have public defender systems than in jurisdictions that
use contract attorneys who are paid by the case.222
218. See id. at 9-10 (describing the Colorado case-weighting system).
219. The term "states" encompasses both state legislatures and state and local indigent
defense boards. Three of the jurisdictions that currently have workload or caseload limitations
have passed those through statutory provisions. See id. at 13 (listing Wisconsin, New
Hampshire, and Washington as jurisdictions that have statutory provisions limiting indigent
defender workloads). In most of the other jurisdictions with workload or caseload limitations,
indigent defense boards have set those limits. Id. at 10-12. Although indigent defense boards
certainly have more experience with assessing manageable workloads for indigent defense
providers than do legislatures, at this point there is no proof to suggest that one method of
selecting limitations is more effective than the other.
220. This is the system that is used in Massachusetts. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note
125, at 317-26 (describing the Massachusetts system in some detail).
221. Cf. In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.112 Minimum
Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases, 820 So. 2d 185, 189-90 (Fla. 2002) (adopting rule
with general caseload limitation for capital cases but refusing to attach numerical limits or
to give public defender the right to refuse to accept representation if over the limit).
222. If an attorney is paid by the case, she does not necessarily have the same incentive to
2007]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Finally, a jurisdiction could provide indigent defendants with an
enforceable right to secure adherence with caseload limits. The
state, for example, could provide defendants with a pretrial right to
challenge the effectiveness of counsel if there is a violation of
caseload standards.223 In the pretrial context, such hearings could
be held much as hearings are held to determine whether counsel in
a particular case has a conflict of interest. In the conflict situation,
certain facts give rise to a right to a hearing, including, for instance,
if counsel represents a codefendant with a potentially conflicting
defense.224 The trial court in such circumstances must determine
whether the conflict precludes counsel from providing the defendant
with effective assistance of counsel. Similarly, in the context of
excessive caseloads, states could give criminal defendants repre-
sented by lawyers with caseloads exceeding national standards a
right to a hearing at which a judge would determine whether
counsel could provide effective assistance.
Alternatively, the state could provide a post-trial remedy for
defendants convicted while represented by a lawyer with an
excessive caseload. For instance, it could establish a rebuttable
presumption that the defendant has received ineffective assistance
of counsel if caseload standards were violated.225 Yet another
approach would be for states to create a private right of action to
enforce caseload mandates. Standing to pursue such actions could
be granted to defendants threatened with shoddy representation, to
defense counsel burdened with unreasonable work demands, or to
ensure a limited caseload, since the larger the caseload, the more she is paid.
223. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993) (holding that because the caseloads
of public defenders were so high, defendants represented by public defenders were entitled
to pre-trial hearings with a rebuttable presumption that they were not receiving
constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel); cf. Dripps, supra note 122, at 287-
302 (advocating causes of action to litigate the ability of counsel to represent the defendant
prior to the criminal trial).
224. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (holding that defendants had a right
to a hearing upon request where counsel represented co-defendants); see also Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (holding that a court is not necessarily required to hold a
hearing absent a request by counsel).
225. See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1384 (Ariz. 1984) (holding, in a pre-Strickland case,
that the use of a procedure for selecting indigent defense standards that resulted in serious
violations of recommended caseload standards would give rise to an "inference that the
procedure resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel, which inference the state will have the
burden of rebutting").
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others such as judges, bar associations, or even ordinary citizens,
depending on state constitutional limits. Available remedies could
include injunctive relief, such as mandated state appointment of
additional defense counsel, state dismissal of some pending matters,
or state reassignment of already-employed attorneys.
Each of these mechanisms has strengths and weaknesses. The
critical point, however, overarches these concerns. That point is that
each state must adopt some form of meaningful caseload lim-
its-both numerical and enforceable-so that resources saved by
reducing the total number of cases channeled into the indigent
defense system are used to reduce caseloads of indigent defenders,
rather than to reduce indigent defense budgets.
CONCLUSION
In a world of limited indigent defense resources, states must
make a choice: They can provide minimal representation to all
indigent defendants, or they can deny counsel to defendants facing
low-level misdemeanor charges and focus those resources on the
representation of defendants facing charges of the greatest severity.
To date, most states have taken the former route, thus sacrificing
quality representation for all defendants as caseloads have skyrock-
eted. Because the data suggest that the value of counsel is relatively
low in misdemeanor cases, states should rethink this approach.
By reducing the number of cases in which the defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel and providing counsel only when
the Constitution requires appointment, states can save valuable
indigent defense resources. Those resources, in turn, can and should
be used to implement caseload limitations for indigent defense
counsel who represent defendants charged with serious offenses. In
short, states should focus their indigent defense resources on those
who need them most-defendants who have a constitutional right
to counsel, who gain the greatest benefit from counsel's assistance,
and who face the gravest consequences in the absence of forceful,
focused, and skilled representation.
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